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A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO ETHICS2 
anuary, 1932, when I had the privilege of lecturing 
aesthetics. I n  the first of the lectures which I am giving 
now, I would like t o  call your attention t o  similar possibil- 
ities in the field of ethics. It is an especial pleasure for me 
t o  be with you again; and I can only hope that  you will 
find your confidence justified, a t  least t o  the extent t ha t  
the three very diverse subjects considered will be novel 
and interesting. Only in the last of these will any mathe- 
matical technique be involved. 
Since the time of the German philosopher, Immanuel 
Kant, i t  has been clear that, for certain purposes, philo- 
sophic thought may be treated separately in its logical, 
aesthetic, and ethical aspects, concerned respectively with 
the true, the beautiful, and the good. 
I n  the last century logic has developed into an independ- 
ent discipline-the edifice of syllogistic thought-of which 
all of mathematics appears as the grandiose superstructure. 
The concept of “aesthetic measure” which I laid before 
‘Delivered a t  the Rice Institute, March 6, 7, and 8, 1940, by George David 
Birkhoff, Ph.D., Sc.D., LL.D., Perkins Professor of Mathematics a t  Harvard 
University. 
aMany of the ideas presented in this lecture were first given by the author in a 
lecture entitled “A Program for Quantitative Ethics,” delivered a t  the University 
of Washington under the auspices of the Walker-Ames Foundation, July 19, 1939. 
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I”’ a t  the Rice Institute, my  topic was tha t  of quantitative 
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you in 19323 made possible a more or less mathematical 
treatment of aesthetics giving promise of taking the sub- 
ject of analytical aesthetics out of the domain of philosophic 
speculation into the region of common sense thought. The 
question thus presents itself almost irresistibly t o  the mind : 
Is not a similar treatment of analytic ethics possible? M y  
aim here is t o  show that such a program seems to  be feasible. 
T o  most mathematicians the tendency towards increasing 
mathematization in these three fundamental aspects of 
philosophic thought-logic, aesthetics, and ethics-is only 
what was t o  be expected; for they are likely to  agree with 
the dictum of the great French philosopher and mathema- 
tician, Ren6 Descartes, omnia apud me mathernatica jiunt- 
with me everything turns into mathematics! 
Even in early Greek times the philosopher Pythagoras 
tried to  bring mathematical order into the ethical field by 
asserting that justice is represented by a square number. 
This must be looked upon as a mystical conjecture of real 
importance for ethics. Similarly Plato and Aristotle were 
always desirous of showing the close relationship of the good 
and the beautiful, if not their essential identity; and they 
regarded the beautiful as characterized by unity in variety. 
Thus, there has always been observable in ethics, as well as 
in aesthetics, a tendency towards quantitative formulation. 
The supreme goal of the Jummum bonum or highest good, 
adopted by the Greeks, is suggestive of this; and the mod- 
ern utilitarian principle of “the greatest good of the greatest 
number” reveals still more clearly the same tendency. 
A very interesting analogy between aesthetics and ethics 
is the following. Individuals of so-called artistic tempera- 
*See my lectures, “A Mathematical Theory of Aesthetics and its Application 
t o  Poetry and Music,” delivered a t  the Rice Institute in January, 1932, published 
in the Rice Institute Pamphlet, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July, 1932; and also my book, 
Aesthetic Measure (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). 
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ment often look upon their personal experiences as a suc- 
cession of aesthetic adventures from which they t ry  to  ex- 
tract the greatest possible enjoyment. Similarly, persons 
of predominantly moralistic type strive for a maximum of 
moral satisfaction by making in their daily lives such ethical 
decisions as will best promote the material and spiritual 
well-being of their fellows. 
Just as the analysis of experience from the aesthetic point 
of view yields the concept of “aesthetic measure”-the 
ratio of aesthetic reward t o  effort of attention-as basic in 
the evaluation of aesthetic pleasure, so the consideration 
of experience in its ethical aspects leads t o  an analogous 
concept of “ethical measure”-the amount of moral satis- 
faction based on good accomplished. 
The  simple ethical formula evidently suggested is: 
M (ethical measure) =G (total good achieved). 
From this point of view the ethically-minded person4 endeav- 
ors always t o  select t ha t  one of the possible courses of action 
which maximizer the ethical measure G, just as the aestheti- 
cally-minded person continually compares aesthetic objects 
and prefers those which maximize the aesthetic measure 
O/C6. The utilitarian calculus of Jeremy Bentham repre- 
sents a suggestive semi-philosophical attempt in the same 
direction.6 
Let us consider a little more in detail this general paral- 
lelism between the aesthetic and ethical domains. I n  order 
t o  do this the use of parallel columns is convenient. 
‘Or corporate body or state. 
60=order, C=complexity. 
eIn this connection, Mr. P. A. Samuelson of the Society of Fellows of Harvard 
University calls my attention to  F. Y .  Southworth’s very interesting volume on 
Mathematical Psychics (1881). 
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Aesthetics 
Some of the principal 
aesthetic ‘factors’ are: (+, 
of positive type) repetition, 
similarity, contrast ,  bal- 
ance, sequence, centers of 
interest or repose; (-, of 
negative type) complexity, 
ambiguity, undue repeti- 
tion, unnecessary imperfec- 
tion. These factors enter 
into the terms 0 and C of 
the aesthetic formula, 
M =O/C 
The factors involved in 
the order 0 may be divided 
into formal and connotative 
elements  of order ,  while 
the complexity C is formal. 
Only the formal type of ele- 
ments in 0 admits of quan- 
titative treatment. 
I n  aesthetics, objects of a 
definite class are t o  be com- 
pared in regard to  their 
relative aesthetic measures 
M .  Such classes are of ex- 
traordinary variety. The 
theory of aesthetic meas- 
ure is best exemplified by 
certain simple formal visual 
Ethics 
Some of t h e  pr incipal  
ethical ‘factors’ are: (+, of 
pos i t i ve  t y p e )  m a t e r i a l  
good, sensuous enjoyment, 
happiness, intellectual and 
spiritual achievement; ( -, 
of negative type) material 
waste and destruction, pain, 
sorrow, intel lectual  and  
s p i r i t u a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  
These enter into the term G 
of the ethical formula, 
1w =G 
The factors involved in 
the good, G, may be divided 
into the material and the 
immaterial elements of the 
good. Only the material 
type of elements admits of 
quantitative treatment by 
the formula. 
I n  ethics, each single def- 
inite problem is t o  be con- 
sidered by itself, and the 
possible solutions are com- 
pared as to their ethical 
measures, M .  These prob- 
lems are also of extraordi- 
nary variety. The main in- 
terest in ethics is provided 
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and auditory fields, pro- 
vided by art rather than by 
nature. 
A r t i s t s ,  connoisseurs ,  
and critics of all kinds are 
considered to  be especially 
competent judges in their 
special aesthetic fields. But 
the aggregate opinion of 
ordinary lay observers plays 
a vital rble. 
Aesthetic tastes vary from 
one individual t o  another, 
and are relative t o  the pe- 
riod and culture concerned. 
Nevertheless there is a cer- 
tain grand parallelism to  be 
discerned, due t o  the pres- 
ence of ce r t a in  absolute  
elements of order, as, for 
instance, rhythm in music. 
Cultivated human beings 
are generally able to  under- 
stand and appreciate aes- 
thetic objects of all kinds 
and periods. 
Finally, the main phases 
in the history of aesthetic 
ideas and literary criticism 
of special artistic forms can 
be concisely interpreted by 
use of the concept of aes- 
thetic measure. 
by problems arising in prac- 
tice rather than by artificial 
problems. 
Religious leaders, states- 
men, judges, and the so- 
cially elect are regarded as 
the best judges in their sev- 
eral ethical fields. But the 
general intuitive opinion of 
mankind often has decisive 
weight. 
Ethical values and ideals 
vary in a similar manner. 
Nevertheless ,  t h e r e  a re  
always to  be found certain 
absolute elements of the 
good as, for instance, brav- 
ery and loyalty in their 
socially validated forms. 
Careful study of the devel- 
o p m e n t  of such  specific 
forms serves to  explainthem 
acceptably t o  men every- 
where as varied manifesta- 
tions of these absolute ele- 
ments of the good. 
Similarly, the main phases 
in the history of ethical 
ideas and of their many 
special social manifestations 
admit of concise interpre- 
tation through the concept 
of ethical measure. 
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Having called attention t o  this significant general par- 
allelism between aesthetics and ethics, I propose to  consider 
some specific problems which illustrate how the concept of 
ethical measure can be used. I make no apologies for the 
simple character of the ideas involved, since it is inevitable 
tha t  the initial results obtained be rudimentary. As pos- 
sibly suggestive in this connection, it may be recalled that  
the first classification of matter as solid, liquid, or gaseous 
provided a crude trifurcation of nature, which ultimately 
led t o  the mathematical theories of elasticity and hydro- 
dynamics. 
Problem I .  A bus driver regularly takes passengers from 
the starting point A t o  their destinations along the main 
road from A t o  M and along certain side roads on one side 
of the main road. The  majority of the passengers live along 
the main road, and the side roads are short. The driver 
wishes to  be as accommodating as possible and t o  give all 
the passengers equal consideration. I n  what order should he 
take the passengers t o  their destinations ? 
I 
A B D E  G H J K  L M 
His decision is always to  deliver the passengers in the 
natural order of going from A t o  M along the main road. To 
justify this decision he might argue as follows: 
Suppose first that  all the passengers on some trip wished 
to  alight a t  points on the main route, as not infrequently 
was the case. If he took them to  their destinations in other 
than the natural order, the series of passengers (as a series) 
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would be less quickly delivered one by one than otherwise, 
Le., the first passenger would alight later, the second 
passenger also, etc. Since all the passengers are t o  be 
treated as well as possible, this would be regarded as ex- 
tremely objectionable by them. But in the event that  some 
of the passengers wish to  alight along the short side roads, 
the additional times required are very small and in the 
driver’s judgment do not need t o  be considered. Hence 
he finds that  the delivery of passengers should always be as 
stated. 
Let us attempt t o  formalize this simple reasoning. The  
underlying good here, G, may be regarded here as negative 
(-), if we reckon upon the unrealizable good of immediate 
delivery of the passengers as the neutral point (0) from 
which the reckoning starts. Thus we write 
G = -(sum of all the trip-durations for the passengers). 
The  possible solutions to  be considered are the various 
ways of taking the passengers t o  their destinations. 
The two basic assumptions of the driver are almost but 
not entirely in agreement with this definition of G; they are: 
(1) the individual trip-durations along the main road are t o  
be diminished as far as possible; (2) the trip-durations along 
the side roads need not be considered. On this basis his 
decision is obviously as stated and in general will maximize 
the good, G, as just defined. 
However, there might occasionally arise situations in 
which this solution was not actually the best one by the 
formula written above. Suppose, for example, there were 
six passengers, one t o  be delivered at  C, and five a t  D, with 
equal distances AB,  BC, and BD (see the figure above). 
Clearly the ‘best’ solution in this exceptional case would be 
t o  deliver the five passengers a t  D along the main road, and 
then t o  return along the main road and deliver the remaining 
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passenger a t  C. I n  fact, if the driver follows his general rule, 
we have 
G = -22a,  
where a stands for the time required for the bus t o  go over 
any one of the equal distances, while if the driver were t o  
deliver his passengers in the reverse order, we would have 
G = - 14a, 
so that  Sa units of time would be thereby saved t o  the 
passengers. 
Nevertheless, the driver decides to  deliver the passengers 
in the usual way. I n  doing so he goes directly against a per- 
fectly natural postulate referred t o  above, namely, t ha t  if he 
can shorten (or in no case lengthen) the trip-durations of 
the successive passengers, he certainly should do so. 
Obviously the naturalness and uniformity of the solution 
adopted by him operates as an important factor in its favor. 
For the rule of procedure chosen by the driver is readily 
understood by the passengers and any modification of i t  in 
the direction of increased complication might lead t o  dis- 
satisfaction, especially because the time-schedules of the 
trip would become even more unpredictable. 
Thus  we are led to realize that there are instances in which 
the simplicity and elegance of the solution of a n  ethical problem 
muJ-t itself be regarded as one of the imponderable elements of 
the good which enter into G. 
There is a kind of counterpart to  this phenomenon in the 
aesthetic field : Apparently the intuitive aesthetic judgment 
tends through an inner necessity to  prefer formally simple 
elements of order in the aesthetic object. 
It would be easy to  propose other allied problems in this 
field of the ethics of procedure. I n  fact, the last two prob- 
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lems here considered (Y and V I ) ,  dealing briefly with the 
proportionate representation of the states in the House of 
Representatives and with the question of preferential ballot- 
ing, are both clearly of the procedural type. All such prob- 
lems are characterized by the fact that  they involve the 
determination of the most equitable procedure by an agent 
t o  whom the choice of procedure is personally indifferent, 
while the good, G, in question is a material good. 
Our second problem is intended t o  present a very different 
type of ethical situation which is of high significance, and 
which involves both material and immaterial elements of 
the good. Though presented in a specialized form, I believe 
that  the problem selected embodies a situation characteris- 
tic of critical moments in the lives of many human beings- 
moments when the choice must be made between material 
good with attendant failure in loyalty, on the one hand, or 
the sacrifice of this material gain with preservation of 
loyalty, on the other. As has been indicated previously, 
a complete quantitative treatment cannot be hoped for in 
such a problem. 
Problem 11. One or the other of two friends of long stand- 
ing, A and B, is t o  be advanced to  an opening in the organ- 
ization in which they hold positions of the same rank. 
A happens t o  learn tha t  the actual selection will hinge 
upon the judgment of a certain person L belonging to  the 
same organization. Ought A t o  pass this information on 
t o  B ?  
The answer of course is t ha t  in the circumstances stated 
A ought t o  inform his friend B. 
A’s reasons for this decision might be formalized as fol- 
lows: The material goods g A  and g B  which will accrue t o  
him or t o  his friend through such an advancement are the 
same: g A  = g B  = g .  If A informs B, the immaterial good of 
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his friendship, f, with A is retained. Therefore, we have 
simply 
M =g. 
On the other hand, if A does not tell B what he has learned, 
the friendship between them is destroyed, even if B never 
learns of A’s unfriendly act; and so we have 
M = g - f .  
Since g exceeds g-f, A ought t o  tell B, although he realizes 
tha t  by doing so he gives up a definite personal advantage. 
In  the above reckoning the unfavorable effect upon A’s 
character of not informing B is intentionally disregarded 
although it might really be the most important considera- 
tion of all. 
A’s decision t o  pass on the information to  B IS here as- 
sumed to  be made on the utilitarian basis. On a hedonistic 
basis, A might conclude that  if he fails t o  inform B, then 
M =g -j, 
since he will be certain to  win L’s special favor, whereas, 
in the contrary case, 
inasmuch as he would then only have an equal chance with 
B. In  this event, he would have t o  balance the prospect of 
material advancement against his friendship with B. 
Again, according t o  the extent that  A believes himself 
inferior t o  B, he will feel that  his chances are lessened by 
telling B. If A is a loyal friend, however, he will not be 
moved from his decision by such thoughts. 
The basic hypothesis has been made here that the infor- 
mation about L is of legitimate practical advantage to  A 
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and B. It is also assumed that  the friendship between A 
and B is a sincere one, founded upon mutual esteem. For 
clearly if there were no real friendship, A would not be 
under any obligation t o  inform B, any more than he would 
consider it an obligation on B’s part t o  tell him. Of course 
if A believes tha t  B would not tell him if circumstances 
were reversed, or that  B would employ unfair or unscrupulous 
tactics t o  gain L’s favor, the bond of friendship between 
them is already weak; and so the situation would not be 
the one envisaged in the problem under consideration. 
A somewhat similar type of problem, also not infrequently 
exemplified in human experience, is the following : 
Problem I I I .  Two men, A and B, among six, A, B, C, 
D, E ,  F in control of a certain business, have orally agreed 
t o  exchange all relevant information before entering into 
any arrangement with the others. A and B do this in order 
t o  protect their interests in the business. A is approached 
confidentially by C, D, E ,  and I;, and asked if he will con- 
cur in a vote giving him important special privileges which 
are to  be withheld from B. Actually A does not feel he is 
entitled to  these special privileges any more than B is. How 
ought A t o  a c t ?  
The ethical course for A t o  follow is clearly t o  refuse t o  
connive with C, D, E ,  and F.  He should further inform 
C, D, E,  and F that  in his opinion t o  do otherwise would 
not be fair t o  B. 
If A acts in this manner we may write 
M =0, 
meaning thereby that  the status quo ante is not altered. If 
A consents t o  their proposal, we may write for A 
A4 = g A  - f - eB ,  
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meaning tha t  A gains the privileges mentioned ( g A ) ,  loses 
B’s friendship (f>, and possibly incurs B’s positive enmity 
( e B ) ,  fraught with danger t o  him-for instance, the enmity 
of B might lead to  his loss of a valuable reputation for 
business integrity. Here we find in G two elements of 
mainly material nature (gA, eB)  and one of immaterial 
nature (f). 
The  two preceding problems have been taken from the 
field of social ethics. It is of interest that  similar problems 
can be drawn from the field of international ethics. In  the 
problem about t o  be stated there is no intention to  parallel 
closely any actual problem. The intention is rather t o  sug- 
gest t ha t  there may exist somewhat analogous problems 
which admit of clarification when approached from the 
point of view of ethical measure. 
Problem I K  As the result of a war, B has lost a colony C 
to  the nation A. This colony C has subsequently been given 
nearly complete independence by A. This action leaves C 
well satisfied with her status and favorably disposed towards 
A. However, B has an economic need for her former colony 
C, by reason of lack of raw materials which C had formerly 
supplied; and for this and other more political reasons, B 
demands the cession of C back to  her by A. How is A t o  
reply t o  the demand ? 
A reasonable analysis on A’s part might be the following: 
A concludes that t o  return the colony C would not only be 
objectionable t o  C but extremely detrimental t o  A ’ s  inter- 
national standing and prestige as a concession under duress. 
Furthermore, A feels that  if she did agree to  B’s demand, 
other similar demands reinforced by further military threats 
would soon follow. Thus A (and C) might write in the event 
of return of C t o  B 
i v = g B - h A , c  
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(where g B =  material good to  B; hA,C= material and im- 
material harm t o  A and C) and, in the contrary case, 
M =0, 
since there is no reason to  believe tha t  the prospect of ulti- 
mate war is effectively lessened. Hence A and C would have 
to  balance B’s good against their own harm; and so A 
would almost certainly refuse to  cede C back to  B. 
From B’s standpoint, however, the analysis in the case 
of cession would more correctly be 
M = g B  +p,  
(where p =good of peace), since B would not admit tha t  A 
or C would suffer much economic loss thereby, nor tha t  
there could be enduring peace without cession; and B’s 
analysis in the contrary case would be 
M =O. 
Thus the balance in favor of cession is gB+p in B’s estimate, 
and a t  least hA,C-gB against cession in A and C’s estimate. 
Thus there is a very serious conflict of ethical judgment. 
Such a situation naturally raises the question of possible 
compromise. 
In  this and similar cases of apparent conjict  in ethical 
judgments  the thorough exploration of all possibilities of com- 
promise i s  absolutely essential. 
The following is a suggestion of a possibility of such a 
compromise in this particular case: A notifies B and C tha t  in 
recognition of B’s economic needs and of her claims, she will 
henceforth not accept from her colony C any more favorable 
trade status than C accords to  B. 
There is then the possibility tha t  despite A’s refusal of 
B’s demand for the return of C t o  her, B can recover a sub- 
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stantial portion of her former trade with C. Thus one might 
write, in behalf of all the three parties A, B, and C, a formula 
such as 
M = g g B  - i g A  
in the event of such a compromise, as against M = O  if the 
status quo ante is preserved. The sole loss for A would be 
loss of an estimated quarter of B’s trade with her ( i g A ) ;  B 
would recover an estimated half of her former trade with 
C ( + g B )  without loss t o  C; and it might be that the resultant 
improvement in the friendliness of relations between A and B 
would increase the likelihood of a permanent peace and so 
slow down the expensive armament race between A and B 
The question of compromise is extremely important in 
many ethical problems. Is it reasonable to  suppose that  such 
compromises can generally be reached ? In  this connection 
I recall a conversation with Dean Roscoe Pound and Count 
Korzybski some years ago. Count Korzybski had expressed 
the opinion tha t  many conflicts of points of view had their 
origin mainly in misunderstandings as t o  the meaning of 
terms, so that  the conflict would disappear as soon as these 
meanings were agreed upon. I replied that  in many disputes 
the situation resembled rather that  arising between two boys 
contending for a single piece of pie; and Dean Pound was 
inclined t o  agree with me. I n  the tragic condition of the 
world today, the suggestion might be made that  if the divi- 
sion of the single piece of pie into two equal pieces were 
made (a reasonable compromise), both boys could be in- 
duced to  accept their portion! 
Our last two problems, like the first, fall in the field of 
ethical procedure, and are interesting in showing tha t  a 
certain amount of technical mathematical consideration may 
E P ) .  
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be necessary. The first of these is that  of the equitable 
apportionment of Representatives in our Congress to  the 
several states in accordance with the constitutional provi- 
sion t o  that  effect: 
Problem Y.’ The set of states is t o  elect biennially an 
assigned total number of Representatives to  Congress, a t  
least one from each state; and, in accordance with the 
Constitution of the United States, the numbers of Repre- 
sentatives allotted t o  the several states are t o  be as nearly 
proportional as possible to  the populations of the respective 
states. What is the best method of the apportionment of 
Representatives to  the various states ? 
It is first of all t o  be observed tha t  various intuitively 
reasonable postulates may be formulated, such as, for in- 
stance, the two following: Of two unequal states A and B, 
the one with greater population should have a t  least as 
many Representatives as the other; every state should re- 
ceive a t  least the integral part of the exact (fractional) 
number which it is ideally entitled to. 
These two postulates were satisfied by the former Vinton 
method of apportionment which may be described as fol- 
lows. The  theoretical size of a congressional district (i.e., 
its population) is first calculated, and on this basis the 
exact number of Representatives (not in general an integer) 
for each state is determined. Each state then receives a t  
least as many Representatives as the integral parts of these 
numbers; and one additional Representative is assigned t o  
the states in the order of decreasing fractional parts of these 
numbers until the required number of congressional Repre- 
sentatives is reached. Thus, if there were three states with 
the calculated numbers 3.72, 2.41, 1.87, with a correspond- 
’For the mathematical conclusions accepted below without analysis see E. V. 
Huntington’s article “On the Method of Equal Proportions,” Trans. Amrr. Math. 
sot., pp., 85-1 io, v o ~ .  30, (1930). 
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ing total of eight Representatives, there would first be as- 
signed respectively, 3, 2, and 1 Representatives, leaving two 
still t o  be assigned. These would then go to  the third and 
first states with the larger fractional parts, (.87 and .72 
respectively) so that  the final assignments by the Vinton 
method are 4, 2, and 2 respectively. 
It is significant that  this very simple method was ac- 
cepted until it led to the “Alabama paradox,” exemplified 
when an increase in the total number of Representatives 
from 299 t o  300 led t o  an actual decrease in Alabama’s 
quota of Representatives! Here there was violated another 
very simple and natural postulate: If the assigned total of 
Representatives for all the states is increased, the assign- 
ment t o  each of them should certainly not be diminished. 
This outcome was manifestly unreasonable from the poli- 
tical point of view, and led t o  the use of Willcox’s so- 
called “method of major fractions” instead of the Vinton 
method. 
Willcox’s method is very simple in statement and is a t  
once seen t o  avoid the “Alabama paradox.” It may be 
formulated as follows: Determine as before the number of 
Representatives for each state, and assign t o  each state the 
next lesser integral number if the fractional part is less than 
one-half, and the next greater if i t  exceeds one-half (Le., is 
a major fraction). Then, a t  least if this rule yields the de- 
sired total number of Representatives, the assignment will 
be tha t  designated by the Willcox method. If i t  does not 
do so, increase or decrease the (theoretical) size of a “con- 
gressional district” until the correct total number is se- 
cured. This allocation of Representatives will yield the 
proper result, according t o  the Willcox method. 
More recently, Huntington has proposed his method of 
equal apportionment which not only avoids the Alabama 
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paradox but has two additional formal advantages over the 
Willcox method : (1) it automatically assigns a t  least one 
Representative to  every state, in accordance with the con- 
stitutional requirement, as the Willcox method may fail to  
do; (2) the Huntington method makes no distinction be- 
tween the mathematically dual notions of “congressional 
district” and “individual share” while the Willcox method 
arbitrarily prefers the latter.” 
Thus here again considerations of simplicity and elegance 
enter in determining the relative merits of the two methods 
of apportionment. 
I n  Willcox’s method, from our standpoint of “ethical” 
measure, it  is not hard t o  show that  there is an underlying 
ethical measure for any two states 
where PI and P2 are the populations of the two states, and 
Cl and Ca are the proposed numbers of congressional seats 
for these states. In  the unnamed dual method we have 
similarly 
The corresponding choice of M for Huntington’s method of 
equal apportionment is 
M = - 1  log --log PI 51. C1 CZ 
*According to  Huntington (Congressional Record, April 28, 1941) the test of 
equal proportions is to be stated as follows: “A proposed transfer of a seat from 
one state to  another state should be made when and only when the percentage 
inequality between the congressional districts in the two states is reduced by the 
transfer.” The words “congressional districts” may be replaced by “individual 
shares” if one so desires, since Huntington’s method of apportionment is self-dual. 
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All three methods fulfill the following further important 
and natural requirement: The assignment should be made 
in such wise that it cannot be improved between any pair 
of states by transferring a Representative from one state 
to the other. 
The second postulate mentioned above as satisfied by the 
Vinton method is not satisfied by any of these three methods. 
It seems to be abundantly borne out in this and other ex- 
amples that apparently justifiable postulates are often mutually 
contradictory, so that a choice has to be made between them. 
Two further remarks of general import may well be made. 
If the populations of the states were to  remain nearly fixed 
for long periods of time, injustices might be regularly inflicted 
upon certain of them, so that some further modification of 
the method of apportionment mentioned might become de- 
sirable. In  the second place, from the standpoint of ethical 
measure, it would be of interest t o  investigate other pos- 
sibilities. For example it might be our goal t o  minimize 
the largest injustice of underrepresentation for any state, 
then the next largest injustice for some other underrepre- 
sented state, etc., and we might ask what would then be 
the corresponding method of apportionment. Here we might 
adopt the specific measure of injustice suggested by the 
value of M given above for the method of equal apportion- 
ment of Huntington. 
We turn now t o  a very brief consideration of our final 
problem of preferential balloting: 
Problem VI .  A group is required t o  elect one of a number 
of candidates to  an office on the basis of the relative prefer- 
ences of the group. How should the successful candidate be 
determined from the ordering of names on the various 
ballots ? 
Here, too, various natural postulates obviously apply, such, 
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for example, as the following: If one of the candidates, A, 
is named in higher position than another, B, throughout 
(Le., A has more first positions, more first and second posi- 
tions combined, etc.,) then A is t o  be chosen in preference to  
B. By the aid of this principle alone the choice is generally 
narrowed down to  a few individuals. 
The  simplest rule of procedure perhaps is t o  rate the 
first position as 1, the second as 2, etc., and t o  add the ratings 
for each candidate. The candidate with the least total is 
then taken to  be elected'. I n  this case we may write for each 
candidate 
M = k  - (sum of positions obtained), 
where k is the number of members in the voting group. Thus, 
if one of the k candidates receives all the first choices, we 
have M=O, the ideal case; otherwise M is negative and is 
smallest for the least sum of indices of position. 
Another possible definition of M would be 
I M = 1 - dproduc t  of positions obtained. 
These two methods would be related much as the arithmetic 
and geometric means are. However the first (usual) method 
has the advantage of being simpler t o  apply in practice. 
It is clear that  a politically-minded person could mani- 
pulate his ballot in favor of special candidates by not in- 
dicating his real preferences. However, such action would 
constitute a serious misuse of the preferential form of ballot- 
ing. 
This problem of preferential balloting has not been treated 
as thoroughly as it should be. 
In  m y  judgment  it would be a very constructive program for 
analytic ethics, to catalogue systematically var iow signi jcant  
*The case of a tie must be otherwise decided of course. 
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problems in the three fields of procedural ethics, social ethics, 
and international ethics, and to  classify the ma in  types of 
solutions on the basis of the formula f o r  ethical measure. 
This has been attempted to  a very rudimentary extent 
in the six special problems above. 
More specifically, social customs and systems of law and of 
religion contain a vast mass of ethical data, embodying the 
accepted ethical solutions of innumerable practical problems 
of analytic ethics; and the inductive method can generally 
be applied t o  treat new problems when they arise. I n  so far 
as these solutions are not purely empirical, they could be 
codified by means of the ethical formula. Such a codification 
would list and classify the very extensive variety of ethical 
intuitions (postulates), in part the cause of, and in part the 
result of, specific social interactions. There is little doubt of 
the basic rble which the sentiments of love, goodwill, loyalty, 
and other feelings of sensuous, aesthetic, or intellectual type 
play in such intuitions. These provide a substratum of ab- 
solute elements, of which the specific manifestation depends 
on the particular culture and period concerned. 
Another useful service of such a program might be to  treat 
the extremely interesting history of ethical ideas by use of 
the same ethical formula. Thus the early Greek conception 
of ethical behavior as directed towards the attainment of the 
summum bonum is evidently in consonance with the ethical 
formula. The customary threefold division of ethical theories 
into those of hedonistic (or egoistic) type, of utilitarian (or 
universalistic) type, and of altruistic type is immediately 
explained in the same way; for if GI denotes the good of an 
individual and G F  the good of his fellows, then the three 
types of ethical theory correspond to  the respective formulas : 
M =GI, M = G I + G p ,  M = G F  respectively. It is hardly 
necessary to  say that  in promulgating a theory which is 
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(supposedly) of the first or last non-utilitarian type, i t  is 
frequently necessary t o  rob Peter t o  pay Paul! 
Many ethical theorists have tended t o  take the good and 
the pleasurable as synonymous; thus, according t o  Ben- 
tham, pleasures differ quantitatively but not qualitatively. 
From our point of view, this is a necessary assumption if 
all the  constituents of the good in G are looked upon as 
comparable quantities, as required by the ethical formula. 
Some have regarded the striving for perfection as su- 
premely important, thereby emphasizing the achievement 
of potential good as the final goal; this reaches far into the 
domain of the qualitatioe application of the ethical formula. 
Still others, like Kant, insist upon the dominating r61e 
of the sense of duty as the “categorical imperative.” This 
validates the innumerable ethical intuitions on which con- 
crete decisions concerning the immaterial good must always 
depend. Through the sense of duty we feel t ha t  it is pos- 
sible t o  distinguish clearly between right and wrong, in- 
dependently of our particular backgrounds, although care- 
ful analysis reveals t ha t  this independence is by no means 
complete. I n  fact the formalization of such intuitions, 
combined with the use of the general ethical formula, leads 
t o  the analytic solution of ethical problems by means of 
reasoning-a point of view going back t o  Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle. 
There is a further reason why the systematic codification 
of ethical notions might be of genuine service. Ordinary 
language provides a vast storehouse of convenient symbols, 
which (as has been recently emphasized) often bring to- 
gether under one name a number of quite different entities. 
For example, we speak of “fatigue” with a good deal of cer- 
tainty. But what is fatigue? There are specific conditions 
of fatigue of the muscles, of special nerves, etc; but what 
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have they in common ? Careful experimentation, systematic 
analysis, and detailed classification are necessary for the 
proper elucidation of this question. This has indeed been 
accomplished recently by Professor L. J. Henderson and 
his colleagues in the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory; and the 
final upshot is that  “fatigue” designates not one thing but 
many, grouped together largely because of intellectual con- 
venience. Of course the notion of fatigue has no immediate 
ethical import. 
Now many of the terms used constantly in ethical dis- 
cussions have an even less definite meaning, and frequently 
provide a convenient emotional support for ethical or un- 
ethical action. Certain of these general terms, such as 
“wisdom” and “justice” seem t o  be mainly constructive in 
their effect, but others, like “racial superiority,” for ex- 
ample, are positively destructive and dangerous, unless their 
various meanings have been made very specific. For in- 
stance, in speaking of racial superiority, which of the qual- 
ities listed below do we regard as really characteristic? 
Physical prowess and beauty; racial purity; descent from 
divine ancestors; intellectual capacity and achievement; 
aesthetic sensibility and artistic creativeness; unselfish ideal- 
ism; unlimited devotion t o  the state; economic efficiency; 
military might; high potentiality of further development ? 
Evidently there are many consistent points of view as t o  
what constitutes “racial superiority”; and so wherever the 
idea is used i t  needs to  be properly defined and accurately 
applied in the selected sense. 
Our thought here is akin to  that  of Korzybski, that  when 
human beings realize that certain important general terms 
have a variety of distinct meanings, the effect of this realiza- 
tion is definitely prophylactic against misunderstanding, 
prejudice, and intolerance. If the clarification of such im- 
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portant but multiple-valued ideas is not effected soon, the 
present tragic confusion among men may end in the destruc- 
tion of civilization. 
Such is the general program for ethics t o  which I desire 
t o  direct attention. It is analogous in many respects t o  
that  which I have attempted t o  carry out provisionally in 
aesthetics. The program involves the introduction of ele- 
mentary quantitative ideas based on a simple formula for 
“ethical measure” in order to clarify and codify the vast 
ethical domain. Conceivably such a program might perform 
the same kind of useful service for ethics as elementary logic 
performs for mathematics, and grammar for language. 
